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DICKINSON LAW REVIEW'
THE SOLID FUELS ADMINISTRATION FOR WAR
and
INDUSTRY ADVISORY GROUPS
By
JESSE B. MESSITTE AND ROBERT WOLFE*
A basic policy of the Solid Fuels Administration for War, established by
Executive Order No. 9332,1 has been to provide for the participation by repre-
sentatives of producers, wholesalers and retailers of coal in the tasks essential
to the accomplishment of the objectives of that order.2 The purpose of this article
is to describe the area and scope of this participation by representatives of the
solid fuels industries3 in the administration of Executive Order No. 9332 and to
assess the significance of this participation.
The role played by industry representatives in the administration of Execu-
tive Order No. 9332 can best be outlined in the context of the powers and
duties of SFAW and of the general nature of the supply distribution problems
faced by SFAW. SFAW collects data from the solid fuels industries and from
other sources, both private and governmental, and, on the basis of such data,
makes recommendations to other governmental agencies concerning prices, equip-
ment, manpower and transportation for the solid fuels industries, to the end that
these industries may be enabled to meet military, and essential industrial and
civilian requirements for solid fuels. The Solid Fuels Administrator also has the
power to determine the times and areas within which rationing of solid fuels
should become effective; and he exercises, with respect to solid fuels and "subject
to the direction of the Chairman of the War Production Board", tht allocation
and rationing power4 of the President conferred by the Second War Powers
Act, 1942.r
*Jesse B. Messitte is the General Counsel of SFAW. Robert Wolfe is on the legal staff.
This article is a reflection of the personal views ot the writers and is not an expression of the offi-
cial opinion of SFAW.
18 F. R. 5355, issued April 19, 1943. This order abolished the Office of Solid Fuels Co-
ordinator for War that had been organized in the Department of the Interior and had functioned
pursuant to a letter of the President to the Secretary of the Interior, dated November 5, 1941.2
Section 3 (a) of the executive order empowers the Solid Fuels Administrator to "appoint
such general, regional, local, or functional solid fuel industry committees as the Administrator finds
necessary...
3"Solid fuels" are defined in the executive order as including "all forms of anthracite, bi-
tuminous, sub-bituminous, and lignitic coals (including packaged and processed fuels, such as
briquettes) ". "Solid fuels industries" are defined as "the development, production, preparation,
treatment, process, storage, shipment, receipt, and distribution of solid fuels within the United
States, its territories and possessions, but does not include the transportation of solid fuels."4
"Rationing" is sometimes considered as involving apportionment of available supply at the
dealer-consumer level, and "allocation" is sometimes considered as involving apportionment of
available supply at all other levels.
556 Stat. 176, 50 U.S.C.A. § 606 (q) (Supp. 1942).
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The responsibilities of and the problems presented by the duty of seeing to
it that solid fuels are distributed equitably and in such a way as to secure maxi-
mum war production are probably not surpassed in difficulty by the respon-
sibilities and problems of any other national war agency. No one would dispute
the proposition that in the maintenance of a vigorous war econmy coal has to be
available for consumption in the right amounts at the right places at the right
times.' However, the magnitude of the business of mining and marketing coal
is perhaps not generally apprehended. At the present time there are estimated
to be about 15,000 mines in operation, about 14,000 producers of coal, about
1,500 wholesalers, tens of thousands of retail dealers of coal and millions of
coal consumuers. All these persons are either subject to, or affected by, SFAW
regulatory activities. During the week ending November 20, 1943, when pro-
duction had been resumed after the last strike and had been stimulated by the
existence of a contract between the Goverfiment and the United Mine Workers
of America, 13,907,000 tons of coal were produced. Approximately 38,740
rialroad cars of coal moved daily during that week from the mines and collieries.
The governmental responsibility for seeing to it that these 38,740 cars, as well as
the substantial tonnages of coal moving by truck, river, lake or tidewater, moved
to the right places was in the hands of SFAW.
Various factors have contributed to the making of the solid fuels supply
and distribution situation for the coal year 1943-1944 much too tight for com-
fort. The productive efficiency of industries other than the solid fuels industries
has, of course, been hampered by increasing shortages in machinery and man-
power. That maximum production of coal has been crippled by difficulties
stemming from the inability of mine management and labor to negotiate a wage
agreement in 1943 is well known. We would not be accurate if we were to at-
tribute the difficulty of securing equitable wartime distribution of coal to an in-
crease in the "demand for coal." We have to speak in terms of "'demands for
coals." Great technological improvements in coal burning equipment have taken
place during the last two decades so that today the burning equipment of many
domestic and most industrial consumers is designed to burn most efficiently coal
of a certain size and possessing certain physical and burning characteristics. As a
result, there are demands for particular sizes or grades of coal, and many so-called
fuel shortages exist, not because there is lack of adequate solid fuel but because
there is less than enough of particular sizes or grades of coal to satisfy the con-
sumer who in a pinch can use alternate solid fuel.
The duty of assuring equitable distribution of coal is further complicated
by the fact that, although coal is produced in many widely-separated sections of
61n 1942 coal supplied over half the Nation's energy; it supplied about 55 per cent of the fuel
used by public utilities; about 80 per cent'of that used by railroads, about 55 per cent of that used
tor domestic space heating. The production of every ton of pig iron depends upon the availability
of 1.3 tons of coking coal. Coal is truly the linchpin of war production.
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the country, many acres requiring substantial coal tonnages are not located near
producing fields. Many areas whose coal requirements have increased because of
war industrialization are not located near producing fields where it is practicable
to effect a substantial increase in production. Additional sources of supply must
be found for areas whose coal requirements have increased; deliveries must be
accelerated to regions and consumers whose need for coal is relatively more
urgent. Frequently a delicate balancing of interests has to be made. The claims
of one region for increased or accelerated shipments must be weighed in light of
the opposition of other regions to receiving substitute coals or to having their
requests for increased shipment deferred.
Finally it must be remembered that coal is mined and marketed only when
there is a demand for it; it cannot be produced and stored at the mines because
of the lack of storage facilities and the bulk of the commodity. It can be stored
at the place of consumption7 or at retail dealer yards and docks. The formula-
tion of any sound distribution program must take into account the buying habits
of consumers and must involve consideration of the extent to which these habits
need to be and can be modified during the war.
Some of the problems incident to the regulation of the distribution of solid
fuels have been indicated. The war agencies established to coordinate and regu-
late the distribution of solid fuels-first the Office of Solid Fuels Coordinator
and the SFAW-have found that successful execution of their duties has been
facilitated by virtue of the ,relatively sound condition in which the bituminous
coal industry-in tonnage produced and capital invested, the largest of the solid
fuels industries-found itself when the demands for coal began to expand tre-
mendously. Under the Bituminous Coal Act of 1937, 8 -enacted without any
provision of its possible utility to the Nation during a war-minimum prices
had been established for bituminous coal at the mines and unfair trade practices
had been proscribed. Assured of recovery of its cost of production, the bituminous
coal industry that had lost money as an industry for nearly a generation had been
encouraged to engage in capital developmental work, and by 1942 the process
of rehabilitation was so advanced that the industry was able to contribute to war
production approximately 570 million tons of coal for 1942 and approximately
589 million tons of coal for 1943, the largest two-year bituminous coal output
in the history of the United States. Just as useful to judicious control of bitum-
inous coal distribution during the war was the assembling in Washington under
the Coal Act of a corps of governmental administrators trained in coal problems
as well as in governmental procedures. Moreover, tlhe Coal Act provided for
Bituminous Coal Producers District Boards the members of which represented
all segments of the industry-labor, and large and small producers-in their
7Some coal cannot be stored at all. For example, lignite soon "degrades" when exposed to
the air and must be burned within a relatively short period after extraction.8Act of April 26, 1937 (50 Stat. 72, 15 U.S.C. § 828-851), as amended.
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producing districts. These boards became acquainted with the nature of duties
attached to assisting an administrative agency in an advisory capacity.9 The boards
assisted in the initial establishment and subsequent adjustment of minimum
prices, and, after the expiration of the Coal Act, 10 were available as nuclei for
the formation of new industry groups to assist SFAW.
Although bituminous and anthracite production was exceptionally high in
1942, shortages in the supply of coal for special uses began to appear at certain
points. That it did not become necessary to impose any controls over the distri-
bution of coal in 1942 may be ascribed to the salutary working relationships
between the coal agencies in the Interior Department 1" and solid fuels industry
groups. Sources of supply were found by SFAW, with the cooperation of the
Coal Act district boards, for consumers unable to obtain sufficient bituminous
coal. With the aid of these boards and with that of the Solid Fuels Advisory
War Council, discussed below, the Solid Fuels Coordinator successfully waged
the "Buy Now" campaign so that unprecedented coal stocks were built up by
the end of 1942.12
As the efforts of management and labor to reach a new wage agreement
lagged on during the spring of 1943 and threatened to interrupt production, it
was forseen that controlled distribution programs might have to be instituted;
and SFAW was created, with more extensive powers ,to succeed to the Office
of Solid Fuels Coordinator. Shortages in manpower and machinery grew more
acute in 1943. The strikes resulted in the loss of substantial tonnages."3 The
rate of production did not keep pace with the rate of consumption. 1 4 Controlled
distribution programs had to be instituted if suffering and inconvenience to
OThe Coal Act was originally administered by an independent regulatory commission, the Na-
tional Bituminous Coal Commission. After July 5, 1939, it was administered by the Bituminous
Coal Division in the Department of the Interior. Although the Division encouraged the district
boards to participate to a significant degree in the administration of the Coal Act, its position was
that under the statute final authority and responsibility inhered in it. The position of the Division
was upheld in BINKLEY MINING COMPANY V. WHEELER, 133 F. (2d) 863 (C.C.A. 8th, 1943),
cert. denied, 319 U.S. 764 (1943), where the court held that, in a proceeding instituted by a dis-
trict board for the purpose of ascertaining whether applicable minimum prices had been violated
and where the district board later refused to continue the proceeding, the Bituminous Coal Division
had the power to continue it.
10The Ways and Means Committee of the House of Representatives voted on July 5, 1943, by
a vote of thirteen to eleven not to report out favorably any of several pending bills that would have
extended the Coal Act. That Act expired by its own terms on August 24, 1943.
lThe Bureau of Mines is in the Department of the Interior. The personnel of and the data
collected by this agency and by the Bituminous Coal Division were utilized by SFAW and its pre.
decessor agency, the Office of Solid Fuels Coordinator. Until the expiration of the Coal Act the
solid fuels war agencies in the Department of the Interior needed only a small staff.
1
2
Over 90 million tons of bituminous coal were held in stock at the end of 1942. This huge
stock pile helped the country to weather the period of strikes in the spring of 1943 without the im-
position of general controlled distribution programs. Coal was "frozen" in transit and at the mines
during the work stoppages, however.
"3Approximately 35 million tons of bituminous coal and 5 million tons of anthracite were lost.
1
41t is estimated that 674 million tons of coal were required for consumption and export in
1943 and that 650 million tons of coal were produced.
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domestic consumers were to be kept to a minimum and if the war production of
the Nation were not to falter.
The Solid Fuels Advisory War Council was the first industry group appointed
during the war to assist the Government in getting coal distributed adequately.
It was established in February 1942 by Solid Fuels Coordinator for War Ickes.
Since its 'establishment the Council has consisted of 17 members representing all
portions of the solid fuels industries and the coal consuming public.15 Since its
first meeting in March 1942 the Council has met once a month in Washington,
D. C.16
The Solid Fuels Advisory War Council, unlike the other industry groups
that have been appointed, has not been called upon to assist in the actual admin-
istration -of regulatory programs. The primary job of the Council members has
been to consider monthly reports of the distribution situation presented by SFAW
representatives and then, in the light of such reports and in the light of their own
knowledge of coal conditions, to evaluate over-all policies and specific programs
proposed by SFAW and independently to recommend policies and programs.
The Council has appointed several special committees. The expertise repre-
sented by the personnel of these committees is utilized not only for the purpose
of making surveys suggested by SFAW or deemed appropriate by the Council
itself but is utilized also to assist governmental agencies on coal problems. Thus,
a committee has been appointed that has worked on the manpower problem
at the mines and has held numerous conferences with the Chairman of the War
Manpower Commission and the Director of the Selective Service System for the
purpose of obtaining, in accordance with SFAW policy, remedial action to relieve
the critical shortage of mine laborers. Another committee has been appointed
which works with the War Shipping Administration in arranging for an adequate
supply of bottoms for coastal transportation of coal; and another committee assists
the Office of Defense Transportation in arranging appropriate restrictions upon
truck deliveries of coal.
As suggested above, the Council has been useful in making better known
to the Nation the fuel problems which are about to face it. The members of the
Council are men who wield considerable influence among the groups whom they
represent. The cooperation displayed by the coal consuming public is responding
vigorously to the Government "Buy Now" plea, and the substantial public
cooperation with the controlled distribution programs instituted by SFAW, may
1lFour members represent bituminous coal producers; 2 members, anthracite producers; 1 mem-
ber, wholesale distributors; 1 member, retail distributors; 1 member, the tidewater dock operators;
1 member, the Great Lakes dock operators; 2 members represent the railroads; 1 member represents
transportation and facilities other than railroads; and 2 members represent mine labor. There are
2 members who represent the public generally; one of these public members, Dr. Walter Dill Scott,
president-emeritus of Northwestern University, has been Chairman of the Council since April 1942.
l6The monthly meetings of the Council average three and one-half hours in length. Minutes
are kept of each meeting.
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be attributed in large measure to the support of these programs by the members
of the Advisory War Council who were convinced of their necessity before they
were promulgated.
Other solid fuels industries groups created by SFAW assist more directly
in the administration of specific regulatory programs. It will be best to describe
the activities of these groups in connection with the basic programs in the admin-
istration of which they assist. The basic controlled distribution program for
anthracite at the wholesaler level for the heating season of 1943-1944 is embodied
in Solid Fuels Administration for War Revised Regulation No. 2, issued August
27, 1943.17 This regulation requires all wholesale suppliers of anthracite (in-
cluding producers who sell directly to retail dealers) to arrange their distribution
schedules so that, "on the basis of regular equal monthly shipments so far as
practicable," they will have, by March 1, 1944, furnished to destinations and to
retail dealers during the period from April 1, 1943 through March 31, 1944 up to,
but not in excess of, 90 percent of the anthracite that they furnished to such
destinations and dealers during the base period April 1, 1942 through March 31,
1943. Each wholesaler "whose anticipated available tonnage for the succeeding
month is in excess of the maximum tonnage which may be shipped" has to
"make such 'excess tonnage available in equal monthly portions for allocation
by" SFAW. Retail dealers may request a supply of anthracite in excess of 90
percent of the tonnage received during the base period because of increases in
population and burning equipment conversions.
A National Anthracite Distribution Committee, Regional Anthracite Dis-
tribution Committees and a Supply and Distribution Committee have been created
to assist in the administration of the basic program controlling the wholesale
distribution of anthracite.18 The anthracite consuming area of the country has
been divided into six regions in each of which SFAW has appointed an Area
Distribution Manager for anthracite. It is the duty of the Area Distribution
Manager to submit to the Washington Office of SFAW recommendations con-
cerning requests submitted by individual retail dealers or by entire consuming
areas for additional anthracite in excess of the 90 percent tonnage.1 9 Requests are
also filed by retail dealers for additional tonnage on the ground that, because they
had large inventories at the beginning of the base period, the tonnages received
by them during that period do not indicate fairly the extent of the requirements
17An influx of war workers into many anthracite consuming communities located in New Eng-
land and the Middle Atlantic States, the withdrawal of coke from the domestic market and a wide
response to the governmental plea for conversion of oil-burning equipment, had swollen the demand
for hard coal.
IsThe establishments of these Committees was provided for by SFAW Regulation No. 2, issued
June 19. This was a temporary measure controlling the wholesale distribution of anthracite until
September 1, 1943.
19The Area Distribution Managers also investigate complaints that may be made concerning
the provisions or the administration of Revised Regulation No. 2 and investigate the extent to
which the regulation is being complied with.
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of their customers. The primary function of the Regional Anthracite Distribu-
tion Committees is to advise and consult with the Area Distribution Managers with
respect to the merits of these different types of requests. Each Regional Com-
mittee is composed of two producers, one wholesaler and two retail dealers do-
ing business in the regions represented by them. Appointed in August 1943 by
the Solid Fuels Administrator, the members of these Regional Committees are
intimately acquainted with the patterns and problems of anthracite distribution
in their regions. They hold formal meetings once a week, though all or any mem-
ber of the Regional Committees are subject always to call by the Area Distri-
bution Managers.
The National Anthracite Distribution Committee is composed of one repre-
sentative from each of the three anthracite producing regions, two anthracite
wholesalers, and three representatives of retail dealers. When this Committee
was first appointed the anthracite controlled distribution program for the entire
1943-1944 heating season had not yet been put into effect. The first important
contribution of the National Committee was to assist with advice and suggestions
in the formulation of Revised Regulation No. 2. Since the promulgation of this
regulation, the main duties of the National Committee have been (1) to con-
sider the action taken by the Area Distribution Managers and the Washington
Office of SFAW, after consultation with the Regional Committees, with respect
to requests for additional anthracite, for the purpose of offering advice as to the
extent to which exceptions from the provisions of the regulation appear appro-
priate for the future and (2) to recommend such modification of, or amplifica-
tions to, the provisions of Revised Regulation No. 2 as working experience with
it may suggest.
The Supply and Distribution Committee is composed of four wholesalers. It
meets in Washington during the first week of'each month. At that time data is
available from reports filed by anthracite wholesalers indicating which anthracite
wholesalers will have during the month a tonnage available for distribution in,
excess of the amount needed to satisfy the 90 percent requirement and which whole-
salers will not have sufficient tonnage to meet that requirement. The sole functions
of the Supply and Distribution Committee are to examine the data compiled by
SFAW relating to the distribution strength of the various anthracite wholesalers
and to recommend to the Administrator which among the wholesalers with antici-
pated excess tonnage available for the month should be directed to make that ton-
nage or a portion of it available to other wholesalers without enough tonnage to
meet the 90 percent requirement. 20
2OThe National Anthracite Distribution Committee meets once a week in New York except
that once a month immediately after the monthly meeting of the Supply and Distribution Commit-
tee in Washington it holds its meeting in that city for the purpose of considering and commenting
upon the recommendations of the latter committee.
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The National and Regional Anthracite Distribution Committees also assist
in the administration of the basic controlled distribution program for anthracite at
the retail dealer distribution level. Restrictions were first imposed by SFAW upon
retail dealer deliveries of anthracite on the basis of consumer inventories at the
time when the work stoppages of October-November 1943 were imminent.2 1 The
program during the emergency period was to impose stringent restrictions on dealer
deliveries, to freeze coal at the mines and release it to those communities threatened
by cold weather without having sufficient coal or to industrial consumers without
adequate stock-pile protection. However, no data was available concerning the
stocks of household and other "domestic consumers" 22 of anthracite. A method
had to be found for determining with some precision the amounts of coal needed
for domestic consumption in the anthracite consuming communities, and it was not
believed that the information of the Regional Committees concerning the supply
situation at the dealer level in every community in their regions possessed the re-
quisite precision. On the other hand, local communities comprised of retail distri-
butors had been appointed in many of the anthracite consuming communities by the
Office of Defense Transportation to aid in formulating and encouraging the adoption
of so-called "joint action plans" among solid fuels distributors for the purpose of
securing the most provident utilization of motor vehicle equipment and supplies.
In some instances members of these committees did possess the requisite precise in-
formation concerning the anthracite supply situation of their communities. A
"lend-lease" operation was carried out. The ODT loaned SFAW its advisory com-
mittees. The emergency regulation, Regulation No. 6, was based upon the as-
sumption and provided specifically that the local ODT solid fuel advisory commit-
tees would coordinate retail dealer activities in their communities, make inventory
checks and submit recommendations concerning the need to modify in local areas
the limitations placed on dealer deliveries and the need of areas for the acceleration
of deliveries from wholesalers beyond the monthly quotas contemplated by Revised
Regulation No. 2. The incorporation of the industry groups appointed by and
acting under the supervision of another national war agency into the framework of
SFAW administration was continued in the revised regulation for anthracite at the
dealer level for 1943-1944 necessitated by the production losses resulting from the
strike.
23
The controlled distribution program for bituminous coal at the dealer level 24
in history and structure is substantially like that of Revised Regulation No. 6. Its
21SFAW Regulation No. 6, issued October 30. The provisions of this regulation cut across
the provisions of and in effect temporarily suspend OPA Ration Order No. 19. Ration Order No.
19 had placed restrictions upon dealer deliveries of anthracite on the basis of consumer inventories
after the Solid Fuels Administrator had issued an order determining that anthracite rationing should
be effective and after WPB through its Directive 1-W had delegated rationing authorities over an-
thracite to OPA. Directive 1-W and Ration Order No. 19 were revoked on November 17.2 2
Retail dealers of both anthracite and bituminous coal sell to commercial and industrial con-
sumers as well as to household consumers and such institutions as hospitals, asylums and schools.
23Revised Regulation No. 6, issued November 15, 1943 (8 F. R. 15656).
2
4
Revised Regulation No. 7, issued November 9, 1943 (8 F. R. 15442).
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limitations are directed to dealer deliveries on the basis of consumer inventories and
stem from more stringent limitations imposed during the last emergency period of
stoppages in production. But the distribution controls for bituminous coal above
the dealer level have necessarily had to be shaped differently from those imposed
upon the wholesale distribution of anthracite under Revised Regulation No. 2.
Anthracite is marketed within a relatively compact area, 26 and approximately 80
percent of the anthracite mined annually is sold for space heating. Accordingly,
it has been found feasible for the purpose of securing equitable distribution of the
available anthracite supply to require the distribution of anthracite on the basis of a
past historical distribution pattern, to impose a blanket percentage limitation on
the historical movement and to arrange for the distribution of some of the coal
available by virtue of the regulation into that limited number of communities criti-
cally in need of additional coal. But bituminous coal is marketed throughout the
country and approximately 90 percent of the bituminous coal mined annually is sold
for commercial and industrial uses. The shifts that war production has necessitated
in industrial geography have changed the pre-war distribution pattern of bituminous
coal movements to a materially greater extent than they have the pre-war anthracite
distribution pattern. To require bituminous coal wholesalers to ship to industrial
consumers a uniform percentage of the tonnage they shipped to such consumers
during an historical period would be to make no progress toward relieving critical
shortages. In order to secure the most effective distribution of bituminous coal at
the wholesaler level, SFAW has deemed it necessary to issue regulations prohibiting,
diverting or accelerating the movement of bituminous coal for certain uses or for
certain regions;26 to limit the percentages of monthly consumption requirements
that industrial consumers may obtain on the basis of the days' supply they have on
hand so that coal will be made available to build up the stocks of those industrial
consumers with inadequate stock pile protection; and to issue directions to individ-
ual producers requiring them to ship specified tonnages of coal to specified con-
signees whose need for coal is vital and urgent.
The advisory groups that have been appointed to represent the bituminous
coal industry have been of invaluable assistance in enabling SFAW to carry out its
programs for controlling the movement of bituminous coal from the mines through
wholesale channels of distribution. On August 3, 1943, Bituminous Coal Producers
Advisory Boards were appointed for each bituminous coal producing district. With
a few exceptions the members of the district boards under the Coal Act were ap-
pointed by the Solid Fuels Administrator as members of the new advisory boards
2
5Although anthracite is marketed in 44 states, 95 per cent of the annual output is consumed
in New England and in the Middle Atlantic States east of Erie, Pennsylvania.
26Thus, SFAW Regulation No. 3, issued August 20, 1943 (8 F. R. 11652), prohibited the
shipment of coal ex-lake from Great Lakes docks to the Pacific Northwest. SFAW Regulation No.
4, issued August 21, 1943 (8 F. R. 11654), required producers in the Appalachian fields to accord
preference to their commitments to ship coal for all-important use in coke ovens and by-product
plants and to their commitments to ship coal via lake.
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in order that the ntw boards might inherit the governmental experience and the
tradition of cooperation built up by the Coal Act district boards.
These advisory boards assist in the administration of the controlled distribution
programs instituted for bituminous coal. The most important function of the ad-
visory boards has been to aid the Area Distribution Managers2 l in their task of de-
termining to which producers directions should be issued requiring the shipment of
coal to specified consignees. With increasing frequency compliance by a producer
with such a direction means that the producer must either reduce or halt entirely his
shipments of coal to one or more persons to whom he is committed to ship coal.
28
Finding coal for an industrial consumer requesting coal of a particular size and
grade involves not only locating a producer mining coal of such size and grade; it
also involves comparing the stock situation 29 of the consumer requesting coal with
that of other consumers to whom the producer is committed to ship. The familiar-
ity of the advisory board members with the coals produced in their districts and with
the problems of consumers obtaining coal from their districts enables them to ren-
der useful assistance to the Area Distribution Managers in their job of determining
which producers are in the best position to ship a size and grade of coal needed by
a consumer. A tremendous number of requests for bituminous coal that may have
to be disposed of during emergency periods and the great number of technical fac-
tors that have to be taken into account in the process of selecting producers to fill
these requests make this function of the advisory boards one that requires frequent
informal consultation with the Area Distribution Managers.80
These advisory boards are also called upon to assist SFAW in its consideration
of the several approaches that are open to the solution of any particular distribution
problem affecting bituminous coal and in formulating specific programs. Submittal
of contemplated programs affecting bituminous and anthracite coal to the advisory
boards and the National Anthracite Distribution Committee, respectively, as well
as to the Solid Fuels Advisory War Council, has been helpful in eliciting the recom-
mendations and suggestions of many of the best informed minds. But after all the
recommendations are in, the determination as to the course to be followed, whether
it happens to conform to the recommendations or not, is the province of SFAW.
2 7
Area Distribution Managers have been appointed for each bituminous coal producing dis-
trict. They are employees of SFAW.
2SConsequently, in order that they may be protected against liability for breach of contract,
producers desire that directions requiring them to ship coal explicitly order from which commit-
ments and in what amount the coal required to be shipped should be diverted.2 9Data relating to the days' supply of coal for different uses are obtained from industrial con-
sumers by SFAW. The stock situation of any consumer cannot be evaluated solely by a considera-
tion of the days' supply of coal possessed by the consumer. One must also consider the physical
limitations upon the extent to which the consumer can draw down his stock pile, the nearness of
the consumer's plant to sources of supply and other factors.
3ODuring the lake navigation season when Solid Fuels Administration for War Regulation No.
4 operated to curtail the normal flow of Appalachian coals into certain areas, and during the emer-
gency periods caused by strikes, members of certain advisory boards devoted all their time to assist-
ing the Area Distribution Managers in their work of recommending to the Solid Fuels Adminis-
trator to which producers directions should be issued requesting the shipment of coal.
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These, then, are some of the industry committees that assist SFAW in the
necessary wartime regulation of solid fuels distribution. It will be readily under-
stood that any impression of a rigidly-compartmentalized division of function
among the industry groups assisting SFAW would be a misapprehension naturally
arising from a bare recital of their activities. Administration under Executive
Order No. 9332 is dynamic of necessity. The borders of thL area of participation
by industry groups in that administration are of necessity flexible.31 Only two gen-
eralizations may properly be made concerning such participation. First, the area
of that participation, and the procedures governing its exercise, have to be deter-
mined by functional considerations. Whether or not industry committees to assist
SFAW have been appointed along regional or non-regional lines, the size of each
committee, the frequency and formality of committee meetings, depend upon the
nature of the administrative problems to be solved, the funds available for handling
those problems by governmental employees only, and the precise statistical informa-
tion available relating to these problems.
The second generalization that may be validly made is that the functions of all
industry groups assisting SFAW are strictly advisory in scope. The factious dis-
agreements and indecision of the National Bituminous Coal Commission,32 and an
appreciation of the large extent to which the interests of competing coal producing
districts conflict, would have sufficed to deter any solid fuels war agency in the De-
partment of the Interior from delegating its authority to representatives of any of
the special interests subject to regulation under Executive Order No. 9332. In any
event, that executive order did not authorize delegation of government authority
to any industry group. Moreover, the activities of the industry groups have been
confined to an advisory character so that members of these groups created by SFAW
will operate in a manner not counter to the federal anti-trust laws. When early in
the defense program it was recognized that industry groups could play a vital part
in the program but that formation of such groups might be hindered by the reluct-
ance of businessmen to enter into activities that might expose them to prosecution
by the Department of Justice, the Attorney General took the notable step of an-
nouncing that the formation and functioning of industry groups would not be
deemed violative of the anti-trust laws so long as their activities were advisory
only.83 A procedure has been evolved under which the advance clearance by the
Department of Justice may be obtained by any war agency for the formation of par-
3lEmergency problems arise and conferences are often held with selected members of one or
more of the formally created committees or with a group of producers or consumers of coal who
are not members of any formally created industry group.3 2
See BAKER, THE NATIONAL BITUMINOUS COAL COMMISSION (1941) 117-118.
38This policy was announced in a letter dated April 29, 1941, to Mr. John Lord O'Brian, Gen-
eral Counsel, OPM, by the then Attorney General, now Mr. Justice Jackson. It was announced
that industry committee activities would not be violative of the anti-trust laws provided that "each
industry committee shall confine itself to collecting and analyzing information and making recom-
mendations . . . and shall not undertake to determine policies for the industry, nor shall it attempt
to compel or to coerce anyone to comply with any request or order made by a public authority."
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ticular industry advisory groups.34 SFAW supervises all activities of these advisory
groups and requires them to submit proposed plans of operation3 5
The functioning of these industry advisory groups established by SFAW may
be considered as a specimen in the laboratory of public administration now perforce
being conducted in Washington. Like other national war agencies,"6 SFAW has
made use of a public administration technique that had been employed during
peacetime.37 Any attempt to appraise at this time the extent to which SFAW has
accomplished the objectives of Executive Order No. 9332 would be premature; but,
if past performance be a criterion, it may be confidently predicted that when a final
appraisal of the administration of that executive order is made the contribution to
its successful administration by the industry advisory groups will be found to have
been a material one.
The national defense program and then war itself have made necessary the im-
position of extensive controls over production, distribution and purchasing activi-
ties. The forging of workable controls needed for efficient prosecution of the war
requires a detailed knowledge of the ways in which commodities are produced, dis-
tributed, purchased. Like other war agencies, SFAW has found that it is not enough
3 4
An exchange of letters was effected concerning the Solid Fuels Advisory War Council (letter
of Solid Fuels Coordinator Ickes, dated February 13, 1942; reply of Attorney General Biddle, dated
February 19, 1942) and concerning the Bituminous Coal Producers Advisory Boards (letter of Solid
Fuels Administrator Ickes, dated October 14, 1943; reply of Attorney General Biddle, dated Oc-
tober 29, 1943).
35The Act of June 11, 1942, sec. 12 (56 Stat. 351, 357, U.S.P., 1940 ed., Sup. II., Title 50,
stc. 1112) provides that when the Chairman of WPB certifies to the Attorney General after con-
sultation with him that the doing of or omission to do any act or thing is requisite to the prosecu-
tion of the war no prosecution or civil action shall be commenced with reference thereto under the
anti-trust laws. SFAW has not found it necessary to request the issuance of a certificate under this
statute to protect any of the industry groups appointed by it; but it has supported a request of the
ODT for a certificate that was issued (Certificate 155) to shield from possible anti-trust law prose-
cution the activities of those distributors of solid fuels entering into joint action plans providing
for concerted action to effect more provident utilization of truck facilities. SFAW has also supported
applications for certificates to cover specific joint action plans under which the signatory coal dealers
agree to limit deliveries during periods of local shortages according to the program of local ODT
committees. SFAW support of these plans was based upon the assumption that the local commit-
tees would be better acquainted with local supply situations during emergency periods than either
it or any of its advisory groups would be; and its support has been given on the understanding that
no action limiting deliveries should be taken in contravention of SFAW regulations and that it
would be informed immediately of any limitations imposed by the local committees. The provisions
of these specific joint action plans do not involve the question of an unconstitutional delegation of
legislative authority to private individuals or the subjection of the business activities of competing
dealers not signatories to the plans to the whim of the dealers on the ODT committees; the pro-
visions bind only those dealers who are signatories to the plans. See CARTER V. CARTER COAL CO.,
298 U.S. 238, 310-312 (1936). Compare CusAcK Co. v. CITY OF CHICAGO, 242 U.S. 526 (1917).
3
6
For the practice of WPB, see Weiner, Legal and Economic Problems of Civilian Supply
(1942) 9 LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS 122, 144-145. Section 2 (a) of the
Emergency Price Control Act of 1942 (56 Stat. 23, 25, U.S.C., 1940 ed., Sup. II, Title 60, sec. 902
(a) directs the Price Administrator to appoint industry advisory committees to represent, at its re-
quest, any industry subject to maximum prices. Like Executive Order No. 9332, other executive
orders grant authority to appoint advisory groups; for example, Executive Order No. 8890 (Office
of Defense Health and Welfare Services), Executive Order No. 8989 (Office of Defense Transpor-
tation), Executive Order No. 9276 (Petroleum Administration for War).
.
7
See footnote 9, supra.
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merely to recruit "technical" men from the regulated industries to serve as govern-
mental employees or consultants. The distribution of solid fuels is carried on by a
vast complex of practices necessarily varying from region to region. SFAW could
not possibly attract into its service as governmental employees enough men con-
versant with those practices. The administrative problems of SFAW of how best
to expose itself to informed opinion so that it may make a sound prognosis of the
workability of its programs, and how best to obtain assistance to see these programs
through successfully, have been met by utilization of industry advisory groups.
Public support for the regulatory activities of SFAW has been engendered
by the utilization of advisory groups. These groups understand the background
of SFAW policies and programs. They are able to explain the necessity for and
the provisions of SFAW regulations. This results in public cooperation. We do
not mean to say that violations of SFAW regulations have not occurred, but
compliance with those regulations has been substantial.
As a specimen in the public administration laboratory examined for the
purpose of discovering new ways for affecting more efficacious employment of
industry advisory groups, SFAW experience with industry groups does not yield
a startling case history. It reveals what an informed common sense would have
foreseen.
Should it develop that the SFAW industry advisory groups have contributed
to a successful administration of Executive Order No. 9332, then the participa-
tion of those groups in that administration will possess its greatest significance
as a favorable precedent for continued utilization of industry advisory groups
during peacetime public administration. The pre-war queston concerning the
extent to which representatives of interests subject to regulation should partici-
pate in the formulation and execution of regulation will continue to be with us.
This question, which has not received the systematic consideration it merits, 38
assumes a crucial stature because with the growing complexity of society the legis-
lative power had had to be farmed out by the primary and long-recognized legis-
lative bodies to subordinate administrative agencies. The courts have refused to
direct the legislative activities of these agencies.89 Way for continuing to sub-
ject legislative-administrative agencies to informed public opinion will be found.
One possible way is to provide that representatives of the groups to be regulated
should themselves, together with represntatives of the general public, constitute
the governmental agency. What literature there is on the subject, 40 and some of
S8LEISERSON, ADMINISTRATIVE REGULATION (1942) "is notable as the first system-
atic and comprehensive attempt to analyze" this question, BOOK REVIEW (1942) 56.HARV. L.
REV. 150, 151.
3
9
GRAY V. POWELL, 314 U.S. 402 (1941; FEDERAL SECURITY ADMINISTRATOR V. QUAKER
OATS Co., 318 U.S. 218 (1943).
40See LEISERSON, ADMINISTRATIVE REGULATION (1942); Leiserson, Interest Repre-
sentation in Administrative Regulation (1942) ANNALS OF THE AMERICAN ACADEMY OF
POLITICAL AND SOCIAL SCIENCE; WHITE, INTRODUCTION TO THE STUDY OF PUB-
LIC ADMINISTRATION (1939); RAILROAD RETIREMENT BOARD (Monograph No. 8 of
the staff of The Attorney General's Committee on Administrative Procedure, (1940) 13-14,
DICKINSON LAW REVIEW
the experience in public administration, seems to indicate that special interest
representation on the agency itself often tends to result in indecision or in factious
squabbling prejudicial to the maintenance of public confidence.
The disadvantages of direct special interest representation 41 are avoided by
delegating legislative power to governmental administrators and by providing
that such administrators shall appoint and consult with advisory groups represen-
tative of the portion of the public subject to regulation. The use of representa-
tive advisory groups as a method for subjecting the legislative authority to the
impact of informed public opinion is an organic development from historic
methods. 42 Of course, men of ability who possess sufficient integrity and detach-
ment to withstand being unduly influenced by groups representing special interests
must be obtained for public administration, but that is another problem.
43
41A stimulating law review article suggests that through the OPA War Price and Rationing
Boards "the neighborhood is once more a virile government unit." Oppenheimer, The War Price
and Rationing Boards (1943) 43 COL. L. REV. 147, 164. Although the members of these boards
are themselves subject to rationing and price control rules, they are empowered to make govern-
mental decisions that are final uniless overridden by superiors in the OPA organization. However,
the board members do not represent conflicting group interests; each member of a board is affected,
directly or indirectly, by board rulings, but to no greater extent than is a judge by his decisions or
a Senator by Congressional legislation. The functioning of these boards would not seem, therefore,
to be significant in the search for methods whereby informed public opinion can be brought to bear
upon administrative agencies entrusted with legislative power over conflicting group interests.
Oppenheimer points out that the War Price 'and Rationing Boards, "like the Selective Service
Boards, have brought elements of the jury system into administrative law" (163). It might be said
that the relationship between advisory committees representing special group interests and the ad-
ministrator brings into administrative law elements of the relationship between the master in equity
and the chancellor.
42The counsel for litigants before a judge who legislates within the interstices of a statute, or
otherwise, are representatives of conflicting special interests acting. in a recommendatory capacity.4 See FRANK, IF MEN WERE ANGELS (1942).
